The Difa-e Pakistan Rally in Lahore and its Implications for Pakistan

First published at IDSA website, here

On December 18, more than 40 religious organizations gathered at Minto Park in Lahore for a jalsa organized by the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (Defence of Pakistan Council). Prominent amongst those present were Maulvi Sami-ul Haq (the head ofJamiat Ulema-I Islam – Sami and a prominent Deobandi scholar with close links to the Taliban), Liaqat Baloch of the Jamat-i-Islami, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed theAmeer of the JuD (Jamaat ud Dawa), Mohammed Ahmed Ludhianvi (Sipah-e SahabaPakistan, now renamed as Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat), Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer (leader of Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith) and Hamid Gul, former DG ISI. Fazlur Rehman, the head of JUI-F (the other faction of the JUI) was conspicuous by his absence.

However, out of all the groups present, the most visible presence was that of the Jamaat-ud Dawa. In fact, this was the first time that Hafiz Mohammed Saeed addressed such a large multi-group congregation. JuD key role in this rally can be gauged from the fact that its flags were visible across the large ground, and some newspapers like Nawa-i-Waqt estimated that attendance at the rally far exceeded Imran Khan’s rally earlier on October 31. The rally focused on Pakistan’s relations with the United States and advised the political leadership to abandon all cooperation with America. Organized at a time when Pakistan-US relations are at their lowest, the primary intent of this gathering seems to have been the consolidation of religious groups to reassert their position in Pakistani politics.

Primarily, the congregation sought to reinforce Pakistan’s Islamic nationalism. The main banner on the podium was inscribed with the famous slogan of the partition years: Pakistan ka matlab kya? La allah ill allah (What is the meaning of Pakistan? The answer is: “There is no God but Allah”). Below it, the main heading proclaimed that Difa-e Pakistan jihad fi sabil allah se hoga (The defence of Pakistan lies in jihad in the path of Allah). A picture of the Pakistani flag adorned one side of the banner; while the other side carried the words ‘Allah hu Akbar’ (God is Great). Images of weapons of war were also prominently displayed on the banner.

The conference thus fused Pakistani nationalism with Islam and conflated Pakistan’s defence with jihad against external powers. Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer was particularly vociferous in his speech and declared that if America decides to attack Pakistan the whole country will participate in defence of the nation. And he added that the defence of the nation was also the defence of Islam.

Such a stand benefits both the mullahs and the military. Recent incidents like the NATO air strikes have clearly aroused nationalistic sentiments in the country. Hence, a public display of patriotism by religious parties clearly increases their popularity with the public. On the other hand, the military had clearly lost popular confidence as the defender of Pakistan especially after the Bin Laden fiasco and the NATO air strikes. Thus, the backing of the mullahs to take on the US gives the military a much needed character certificate.

The show of strength at Lahore indicates that there is some kind of a consensus between the military and the religious parties. At a moment when Pakistan is reeling under a political crisis (thanks to memogate and NATO attacks) such a public spectacle had to have the blessings of the agencies. By allowing such a public outburst by Islamic parties, the military might have killed two birds with one stone: obtain the support of religious organizations on the one hand and reaching out to the jihadi militants on the other, as a promoter of militant Islamic nationalism.

Winning the confidence of the mullahs also serves another, more immediate purpose for the military. As it has become clear that the Establishment has reinitiated negotiations with the TTP (Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan), the support of the SIC (Sunni Ittehad Council) could be helpful in persuading the TTP to take a more flexible stand vis-à-vis the establishment. This could occur in two ways. Either the SIC will try to co-opt the Taliban and persuade it not to work against the military, or the military’s cooption of the SIC would isolate, corner and thereby force the TTP to come to the negotiating table. Many leaders of the Difa-e Pakistan movement like Sami-ul Haq and Hafiz Mohammed Saeed are known to have close contacts with the Taliban. These links will certainly play a major role in any future dialogue.

The second possibility is that the Difa congregation was a political move by the military to put pressure on the civilian government and the opposition parties. Although religious parties in Pakistan have never enjoyed significant electoral support, they enjoy political power through indirect means. Firstly, it is entirely possible that the army is trying to put its political eggs in many baskets. Although not all religious organizations participating in the rally are involved in mainstream politics, they do have an indirect influence. By whipping up religious passions against countries like USA, India and Israel, these groups can ensure that mainstream parties do not stray too much from the military’s line on these countries. This was evident from the numerous allusions to the civilian government’s decision to give India MFN status.

Lastly, by staging such a massive gathering in Lahore, it appears that the military is trying to bring JuD into mainstream politics, which is clearly an ominous sign of the times to come. Co-opting such groups could give an impetus and also a sanction for extremist politics in Pakistan in the future. As they get further entrenched in Pakistan’s polity, civilian governments will find it more difficult to contain them. All these factors could further destabilize and possibly reverse the process of the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.

A Rejoinder to John R. Schmidt, 'Pakistan’s Alternate Universe'

This article was published on the IDSA website, here

John R. Schmidt’s article (‘Pakistan’s Alternate Universe’), published in Foreign Policy, tries to offer a counter narrative of Pakistan’s links with the Taliban. However, it would be more appropriate to term the article as the establishment view masquerading behind a thin film of a supposedly neutral counter narrative. In doing so, the author creates a dangerous veneer of legitimacy for Pakistan’s military establishment and its policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Principally, he argues that Pakistan’s fear of India and internal compulsions force it to seek an alliance with Taliban and other unsavoury elements.

At the outset, there is nothing that is fundamentally new in this assertion; Pakistan’s India complex is well known. Having a bigger, hostile neighbour can be a bit unnerving for any country. However, there is a not-so subtle difference between genuine concerns for security and a deliberate exaggeration of the threat – real or imagined. The author’s tone is striking, for it seeks to acquit Pakistan of all responsibility for its decisions by trying to brush them under the carpet of political compulsions.

The first assertion that Schmidt offers in his (or Pakistan’s?) defence is Pakistan’s discomfort regarding India’s growing presence in Afghanistan. In support of his arguments, he mentions India’s $2 billion aid to Afghanistan and the presence of ‘thousands of Indian aid workers’ in the country. It is impossible to comprehend how the presence of aid workers gives India any strategic advantage vis-à-vis Pakistan, unless of course India trains them to conduct surgical operations across the Durand Line. The same goes for the ‘four Indian consulates’. The bogey of the four (and sometimes eight) Indian consulates has been used by reactionary elements in the Pakistani press time and again in order to drum up anti-India paranoia. Pakistan itself has four consulates in Afghanistan, while Germany has three. What does that prove, if anything?

To be fair to Schmidt, India does have designs in Afghanistan that are not purely philanthropic. However, they are also not necessarily nefarious. It is in India’s interest to see an Afghanistan devoid of extremist groups that may be detrimental to its own internal and external security. India also has an eye on Afghanistan’s natural resources and it wants to develop the supporting infrastructure in order to facilitate its commercial interests. However, it would be a colossal exaggeration to argue that India sees Afghanistan as a second front against Pakistan. India is aware that Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long and porous border, and both nations enjoy ties of culture, ethnicity and kinship. Even if it desires, Afghanistan cannot ignore Pakistan. For India, it would be foolhardy to even contemplate such a harebrained scheme, for it can ill afford the luxury of indulging in such costly and fruitless great games.

Schmidt goes on to make a rather fantastic (and if I may add, unsubstantiated) claim that the “Pakistani army is the only force in Pakistani society capable of preventing a jihadi takeover of the state”. Not only is such an assertion patently false, it is also rather dangerous. It is worth pointing out that Schmidt contradicts himself by making this assertion, for he accepts the Pakistan army’s role in supporting the Jihad in Kashmir towards the end of his essay. American diplomats have a time honoured tradition of putting faith in cruel, autocratic institutions of power in order to counter equally cruel religious fundamentalists. Such (blind) faith gives much needed international legitimacy to such institutions and place considerable checks on the growth of democracy in the developing world.

As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, its commitment to uprooting extremists is often influenced by concerns for its own survival rather than any deep ideological aversion to such ‘non state’ actors. In her insightful book Taliban and Anti Taliban, Farhat Taj describes how during operation Rah-e-Nijat in 2009 against Hakeemullah Mehsood’s faction, instead of crushing the group the army merely displaced the group from South Waziristan to North Waziristan. Also, the army has been complicit in the brutal repression of anti-Taliban lashkars in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). There is a world of difference between exercising restraint against these groups and wilfully abetting their actions. The army seems to be doing the latter. Moreover, if Schmidt’s hypothesis of Pakistan’s reluctant acceptance of the Taliban is to be believed, how does one explain incidents such as the Kunduz airlift of 2001?

Towards the end of his essay, Schmidt writes in a very nonchalant manner that “Their decades-old dispute over Kashmir is the reason that the Pakistanis began supporting jihadi groups in the first place, and they are unlikely to sever their final links with them until it is resolved.”

Once again, he tries to portray that Pakistan had no choice but to send its jihadi groups to Kashmir. Pakistan’s support of jihadist groups is mentioned in such a matter-of-fact manner that make Pakistan’s course of action look normal, almost legitimate. Also, the claim is factually inaccurate. Pakistan’s use of ‘non state’ actors has a much longer and colourful history, which starts with the invasion of Kashmir in October 1947. Even in 1971, Islamic militias called Razakars were used to repress the Bengali resistance in East Pakistan. Whatever its own ideological inclinations, the Pakistan army has repeatedly used the rhetoric of Islam and Jihad to achieve less than holy aims.

Schmidt’s essay must have come as a breath of fresh air for the khakis in Islamabad. Whatever his aims, the arguments that he has employed do not stand the test of casual perusal leave alone scrutiny. Furthermore, it bolsters the stance of anti-democratic forces in Pakistan, which is regrettable considering the already lop-sided nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan.

The MFN Debate in Pakistan’s Urdu Press: Sign of cracks?

Coauthored with Shamshad A Khan, and first published on IDSA website, here

Following Pakistan’s decision to grant MFN (Most Favoured Nation) status to India, the Pakistani media indulged in a heated debate over the issue. In line with their traditional stance, the English media took a progressive stance and supported the government’s decision. However there was a tangible division within the Urdu media on this issue.

The Pakistani Urdu press traditionally portrays India as an existential threat with which no compromise is possible until all outstanding disputes, prominently Kashmir, is resolved. This time too, many editorials opined that trade relations with India should not be pursued until India resolves the Kashmir issue. However, an alternate narrative has been adopted by some newspapers like Jang and Express - the two largest newspapers in circulation - as well as by the Peshawar based Mashriq daily.

Express, in its editorial1 of November 4, opined that “this decision is a proof of the fact that our leadership not only realizes the changing realities but also is taking practical steps to reflect the change.” On the same day, Jang took the stand that Pakistan has no option but to choose “trade over aid” and added that “pursuing deeper trade relations will create a congenial atmosphere for resolution of more serious disputes.”2 This stance is contradictory to the dominant discourse in the Pakistani Urdu media, which places conflict resolution over trade or other such issues.

However, Jang dialed down its initial euphoria subsequently by advising India to show more flexibility on the issue of Kashmir. >3 Interestingly, the latter editorial on November 12 did not criticize the Pakistan government’s decision on the MFN status. It is possible that the criticism of India could have been a rhetorical ploy and part of a balancing act to satiate the anti-India lobby and reaffirm Jang’scommitment to the Pakistani state.

In line with their traditional stance, a section of the Urdu press reacted negatively to the government’s decision. The anti-India rhetoric was formulated on two planks. Firstly, many editorials argued that increased trade with India would dilute Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir issue. These arguments coincided with the line taken by Jamaet-e-Islami Chief Munawwar Hassan who termed the MFN status to India as “stabbing in the backs of Kashmiris” by the Pakistani authorities. Secondly, many viewed a liberal trade regime as being inherently disadvantageous to Pakistan and were concerned about the possibility of Indian goods flooding the Pakistani markets.

Newspapers like Ausaf were generally suspicious of India’s intentions and took a pro-military line. The following extract from Ausaf is particularly revealing in this regard: “We will call upon Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, President Zardari, ISI Chief Shuja Pasha and all the patriots to save Pakistan from this kind of agreement.”4 The sequence of ‘patriots’ reveals the inherent ideological bias of the newspaper. Similarly, an editorial in Nawa-i Waqtequated the government’s decision with the “Fall of Dhaka” 5 and criticized the civilian regime for following a policy which was antithetical to Pakistan’s national interest. Similar views were expressed by other regional newspapers in Pakistan like Khabrein, which enjoys considerable circulation in Punjab.

The difference in the stance taken by Khabrein and Mashriq, the former based in Punjab and the latter in Peshawar, is particularly striking. Mashriq has taken the view that providing MFN status to India would help rectify past mistakes. 6Although the association might appear tenuous, this difference in their stances is perhaps indicative of the public mood in the two provinces. The Punjabi middle class is traditionally seen as pro-military with a deeper anti-India bias as compared to their counterparts in Peshawar and the frontier areas, where the India factor is perhaps an issue with lesser significance compared to the ongoing conflict in that area.

Another newspaper, which is generally viewed as conservative and pro-military, isUmmat. Thus, it was no surprise when it expressed strong reservations about the civilian government’s decision to grant India the MFN status. However, its editorial was of particular significance because it inadvertently gave an insight into the changing dynamic of civil-military relations in Pakistan. A report in Ummat quoting a “reliable” source stated that during a briefing on the MFN issue given by the Foreign Minister to ISI Chief Shuja Pasha and other leaders, the military was not particularly happy with the civilian government’s policy vis-à-vis India. The paper reported that the DG ISI wanted to know “why the government is so close to crossing the line on national security.” 7 The editorial added that the military leadership was not entirely convinced by the Foreign Minister’s explanations.

This report indicates that there is disagreement between the military leadership and the civilian establishment on the issue of granting MFN status to India. Based on the information given in the article, two possibilities can be hypothesized. The first possibility is that the army reluctantly tolerated the civilian government’s stance in spite of reservations. If this was indeed the case, then it is quite possible that the civilian government and possibly the trade lobbies were successful in over-riding the military’s opposition.

At the same time, it is also possible that the army itself exercised some restraint. In an interview to one of the authors, Muhammad Ziauddin, Managing Editor of the Express Tribune, 8 stated that there is in fact some rethink going on within the military. Although it would be far fetched to say that the anti-India lobby in the establishment has lost influence, it is possible that there is a difference of opinion within the military leadership leading to lack of consensus, which could have been exploited by the civilian government.

Whatever the case, it cannot be denied that the political class in Pakistan is being more assertive than usual. In a recent statement, the Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Chaudhary asserted that any attempt by the army to act without the orders of the federal government would be considered as unconstitutional. 9 Such statements indicate that although the military is going to remain dominant in the near future, it is no longer being treated as a holy cow.

Many observers have said that Pakistan’s fragile economic condition on one hand and India’s growing economy on the other have forced Pakistani policymakers to rethink their equation vis-à-vis India. However, it is still early and one needs to keep in mind that the anti-India lobby still exercises a lot of influence on the decision making process and the local media. Having said that, the approval from some sections of the Urdu media for the grant of MFN status to India is indeed a welcome sign and it cannot be ignored.

Some critics have argued that the MFN status is only a small step and not a giant leap as it is being portrayed. Be that as it may, the importance of the MFN status issue lies in the debate that the agreement has initiated in Pakistan, which could influence both the internal political structures of the country as well as the way it deals with its neighbours.

1. 1.‘Decision to accord India MFN status’, Express, November 4, 2011.
2. 2.‘Decision to grant India MFN status!’, Jang, November 4, 2011.
3. 3.‘Regional peace responsibility of both India and Pakistan’, Jang, November 12, 2011.
4. 4.‘We should remain cautious while signing agreements with India’, Ausaf, November 12, 2011.
5. 5.‘Another Mischief’, Nawa-I Waqt, November 11, 2011.
6. 6.Editorial, Khabrein, November 4, 2011.
7. 7.‘National Institutions ask for explanation on the MFN decision’, Ummat, November 6, 2011.
8. 8.Amit Julka’s Interview with Muhammad Ziauddin over Skype, November 1, 2011.
9. 9.“Interpreting Constitution SC’s job: Action by army without govt nod illegal: CJ”, Dawn, November 13, 2011.

Book Review: Farhat Taj's 'Taliban and Anti Taliban'

This review was first published on Viewpoint Online, here

When I read Taj’s book, ‘Taliban and Anti Taliban’, I thought a more suitable title for the book would have been A People’s History of FATA, as it has much in common with Howard Zinn’s seminal workA People’s History of the United States. Both books narrate the story of a land from the point of view of the conquered, and not the conquerors. Both books seek to challenge the dominant narrative and conventional wisdom. The only difference is that Zinn’s Native Americans had been vanquished and exterminated about four centuries ago while Taj’s tribesmen are being systematically oppressed and exterminated as we speak.

And this is where the significance of the book lies. It presents the story of a people who have been often been regarded as savages and brutes from their eyes and not the eyes of those who wish to conquer them. FATA has often been termed as Pakistan’s dirty backyard. The state claims that the region is not under its control, and hence justifies oppression against the natives under the garb of the draconian FCR laws. The Americans say that the region is a haven for terrorists. However, no mainstream observer has bothered to tell the story of the people and the way they have been squeezed between the state and the Taliban.

The book starts with the chapter ‘Deconstructing Some Myths About FATA’. In this chapter, Taj questions two fundamental notions that outsiders have about the region and its people. Her first argument is that contrary to popular opinion, the people of FATA are not Taliban sympathizers. She argues that the widespread militant activities in the region have more to do with the state’s policy of treating the Taliban and their ilk as strategic assets. Thus, according to her, the Taliban and other jihadi groups have been imposed top-down and enjoy no popular support. On the contrary, she argues that it is the indigenous people of the region who have tried to resist them, and it is the state’s collusion with the militants that has changed the power structures in the region and destroyed tribal institutions like jirga and Pakhtunwali.

Her second argument is that the state’s attempt to portray the tribal areas as unruly and beyond its control is nothing but insidious propaganda. In fact, it is the state, and especially Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI that has repressed people through legal and extra-legal means. Moreover, she adds that the influx of militants from Afghanistan to Pakistan wouldn’t have been possible without the state’s collusion. This, she claims flies in the face of the state’s claim that some soldiers may have sympathised with the Taliban due to ethnic affiliation or other such factors.

However, I must add that although I agree with the substance of Taj’s arguments, I find her writing style a bit overzealous. For e.g. on page 16 of the book, while countering the arguments proposed by another author, she writes that “The authors’ opinion is rooted in their poor knowledge of the whole crisis in the tribal area”. While her observation about the particular author might have been correct, one just wishes that she could have articulated her views in a more subtle manner.

Further ahead in the book, Taj talks about the controversial issue of drone strikes in FATA. Once again, her research is extensive and she tries to portray the issue sans any ideological bias or political agenda. This is a refreshing contrast to the ongoing discourse in Pakistan, where arguments are a result of a person’s ideological/political motivations rather than the other way around. Taj argues that contrary to the common perception, drone strikes are actually popular with the inhabitants of FATA. However, being an outsider who has never been to Pakistan or FATA, I am in no position to discuss the merits or demerits of her argument.

Besides dissecting the murky politics of the region, Taj also devotes a considerable part of her work to describe the individual personalities that have shaped this conflict. This adds a layer of detail to her work that is otherwise missing in books belonging to this genre. In fact, I would argue that Taj’s entire work is an exercise in micro-analysis rather than macro level geo political approach that most authors have adopted to study this region and its politics. However, I do feel that the book misses one very crucial component which would have made this wealth of information digestible to FATA-laymen like me: a map. This was the one of the few gaping holes that I noticed in Taj’s work.

Towards the end, Taj devotes an entire chapter to Islamic organizations in Norway and their possible connections with jihadi movements in the subcontinent. Although it is commendable that she has made efforts to enlighten the readers about this little known phenomenon, it was a bit out of place with the theme of the previous chapters. In fact, I would argue that this topic deserves another book of its own.

While reading this book, I couldn’t help but wonder how it would be received in establishment circles in Pakistan. As I write this review, Pakistan and US are engaged in a bit of a tussle over ISI’s alleged links with the Haqqani network. I wonder what would happen if the revelations made in this book reaches the public sphere. It could indeed prove to be a source of embarrassment for those in the khaki uniforms. It also remains to be seen how Taj’s arguments are received by the intelligentsia. However, I am sure that whether they like it or dislike it, the book is bound to start an interesting debate.

All in all, I would say that although the book is a little rough at the edges, it does succeed in its primary aim: lending a voice to the voiceless people of FATA.

India's mullahs rake up the Ahmadi issue

This article was published in Viewpoint Online, here
I often find the dichotomy of the oppressor and the oppressed baffling, for it underestimates a very key component of human nature, i.e. hypocrisy and double standards. People fail to understand that the tormented could easily turn into tormentors, given the context.

India’s Muslims are the country’s largest minority. Depending on your source, their numbers range between 160-200 million. However, the community has been subject to injustices of the state and society. Communal riots, encounter killings, poisonous Hindu right propaganda that tries to portray them as outsiders and cultural pollutants; they have seen it all. And if all this weren’t enough, they have to face an even bigger detriment to their progress; their self-appointed leaders. These include et al., mullahs, politicians, and the Urdu press that claims to be their spokesperson.

As I glanced through today’s (24 September) Roznama Sahara, a popular Urdu daily in India, a news article on the front page caught my attention. The article, titled “Qadianon ki ‘Qurani taleemat numaish’ ke khilaf ihtejaaj”. The story described how Muslim organizations protested outside an exhibition organized by the Ahmadi community (described using the pejorative term ‘Qadiani’) because they claimed that Ahmadis were attempting to mislead the public by posing as Muslims (Surprise, Surprise!). The opening sentence said it all:

“Leading Muslim personalities in Delhi held a peaceful protest against an exhibition ‘Teachings of Holy Quran’, arranged by the Ahmadiya Jamaat India, an organization belonging to the Ahmadi sect, which have been declared as non Muslims every where in the world…”

The tone of the article betrays the prejudice on part of the newspaper against a minority sect, followed by no more than 100,000 people in India. I would like to question the editors of the paper behind their rationale. It has no right to brand people as Muslims or Non Muslims. It is high time that these self appointed leaders of the community stopped indulging in the politics of takfir and leave it to the people to determine whether they are true Muslims or not.

This is not the first time that India’s Muslim leaders have tried to rake up the Ahmadi issue. In April this year, C M Naim discussed this issue at length in his article ‘Learn From Pakistan’, published in the magazine Outlook. Apparently, the clerical class has tried to flog this dead horse from time to time. These actions betray both, the frustration of the clerical class, and their ineptitude. Have the Muslims of India run out of problems that they need to focus their anxieties on a miniscule community, which is now being branded as a ‘Threat to Islam’. Have these people learnt nothing from the mistakes of their Pakistani counterparts, and their baloney of branding everyone as Non Muslim?

In 1953, after the anti-Ahmadi violence in Pakistan, the government constituted the Munir Commission to investigate the violence. While conducting his investigations, Justice Munir interviewed several prominent Ulema and asked them to define who is a Muslim. Predictably, all ulema had different ideas about the matter and Justice Munir observed that

“Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama, need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the view of that alim but kafirs according to the definition of every one else.”

But those were the golden pre-Zia days, when Pakistan was still a Muslim country and not an Islamic state. Since then, the country has witnessed the growth of sectarian organizations that seek to outdo each other in Takfir politics. The Sunni will call the Shia an infidel, the Shia will protest against the Sunni. Then, the Shia will call an Ahmadi an infidel and the Ahmadi will protest. Tomorrow, I will not be surprised if some dimwit from the Ahmadi community starts calling for the expulsion of atheists or agnostics. It is a bit like a classroom. The bigger bully attacks the smaller bully. The smaller bully, instead of uniting with his class against the bigger bully will pick out the puniest guy in the class in order to vent his frustration.

Anyway, I digress. The Ahmadi problem in India is inherently different from that in Pakistan. First of all, constitutionally, India is still a secular country. Secondly, our courts have been wise enough to let the people decide their faiths instead of indulging in sectarian politics. Thus, by and large, minority sects in India are safe. However, the growing radicalization within religious communities cannot be taken lightly. The rise of neo-fundamentalist preachers like Zakir Naik, with their cleverly disguised supremacist views and their urban middle class fan following could exacerbate societal tensions in the future.

India’s historical strength has been the accommodation of multiple, and often conflicting views. Surely, we cannot stop people from disagreeing with beliefs of others. However, it is when the disagreement turns into demands to de-legitimize those set of beliefs and people begin to indulge in insidious propaganda, which is when the problem starts. Perhaps it is time that we remind ourselves what Bulleh Shah once wrote,

Bulleya aashaq hoyo rabb da, hoi malaamat lakh

Tainu kaafar kaafar kainde, tu aaho!, aaho! Aakh

(Bulla, the lover of God, a thousand curses are heaped on you

They cry “infidel! infidel! ” - you say “so it is, so it is!”)

A Christian Agenda?

This article was written for Himal South Asian, here

Soon after the attacks in Norway, my Facebook page was filled with updates condemning the Western Media’s surprising double standards in describing Anders Breivik a ‘madman’/’attacker’ and reserving special accolades like ‘terrorist’ for Muslims alone (Please see Stephen Colbert’s hilarious take on youtube!). However, as noble as the intentions of these people were, some of them got too carried away in their tit-for-tat approach and tried to brand Anders Breivik as a ‘Christian fundamentalist’. Anders Breivik was many things; a right wing terrorist, racist, and a cold blooded killer. But the term ‘Christian fundamentalist’ would be a sum lesser than its parts. One describes someone as a Christian/Hindu/Islamic fundamentalist not on the basis of his religious background, but motivations.

A Christian fundamentalist is one whose world view is shaped by literalist interpretations of the Bible and other Christian texts. In Breivik’s manifesto, one sees considerable evidence of a white-supremacist-christian agenda. It is a curious mix of many different ideologies. At the beginning, he shows a very conservative bent of mind by mourning over the loss of traditional European values and the emergence of phenomena like homosexuality and promiscuity as a direct consequence of immigration. However, later on he shows concern over the loss of liberal western values in face of shariatisation of Europe. In fact, his view over homosexuality and the ‘feminisation of men’ coincides with what any conservative Christian priest or Muslim cleric would tell you. Ironically, his own vision for Europe closely mirrors the ‘Euro-Arab’ that he is afraid of.

However, instead of basing these arguments in a religious framework, he places them in a socio-cultural context. In fact, whilst claiming to be a religious Christian, he writes:

“As for the Church and science, it is essential that science takes an undisputed precedence over biblical teachings. Europe has always been the cradle of science and it must always continue to be that way.

Regarding my personal relationship with God, I guess I’m not an excessively religious man. I am first and foremost a man of logic. However, I am a supporter of a monocultural Christian Europe.”

Debate, not Dismiss

Many on the liberal-left (not hyphenated in the strict sense) side have condemned Breivik’s manifesto, and rightly so. However, whilst we should condemn his writings, it would be foolhardy to ignore them so dismissively. A sizeable population in Europe now believes in such propaganda, and it wouldn’t surprise me one bit if the manifesto now acquires a cult status amongst underground networks and future ‘Breiviks’. The manifesto symbolizes the underlying tensions in European society over issues of immigration and assimilation, and it calls for introspection from both sides. Right in the beginning, Breivik highlights on the culture of ‘political correctness’.

This is a complaint being voiced by many people not just in Europe, but also in America and India where people think that Islam is being treated with kid gloves. Ironically, the left, which was the traditional bastion of secularists and atheists, has now become more restrained in its approach as it juggles between championing the rights of minorities and its core ideology. In absence of constructive criticism from the left, the right has been able to capture public attention by indulging in shrill propaganda based campaigns. It is a bit like the right wingers stealing the left’s thunder.

Thus the reason why the likes of Breivik are gaining support is that we dismiss their talk as ludicrous, instead of countering their arguments in a proper manner. To a frustrated man on the street, Breivik’s manifesto will come across as coherent, logical and provide him with all the (wrong) answers. How many manifestos have we come up with to refute his arguments?

Right now, Europe’s far right elements and Islamic neo-fundamentalists are engaged in a vicious feedback loop, the results of which would be devastating for everyone. The longer we stay silent, the longer we shall suffer.

Let a thousand flowers bloom

This article was published in Himal South Asian, here

Years ago, when I was staying in Kolkata, I used to enjoy having long conversations with my driver Khan. I was learning Urdu at that time, and Khan would often help me out on this regard. As time passed, the nature of our conversations went beyond the confines of Urdu, and we would talk about politics, religion and everything else under the sun. One day, as our discussion veered towards India’s Muslim community and all of a sudden, Khan’s expression became more serious, and he said “Problem yeh hai ke hum musalmaan apne bacchon ko padhaate nahin, sirf khilaate rehte hain” (The problem is that we focus not on educating our children, but on feeding them).

It was quite heartening to see that here was this average Javed, hardly educated himself, but who seemed to possess more common sense than the community’s self appointed leaders. And Khan is not the only enlightened soul out there. About a year ago, I met an auto-rickshaw driver Waseem who told me how he wanted his daughters to pursue graduation, in spite of family pressure to do otherwise. It is common practice amongst many to point to the success of Khans in Bollywood and Sania Mirza in tennis to prove India’s success in accommodating its minorities. Their achievements notwithstanding, I think it is the average Muslim on the street, like Wasim and Khan who will prove to be the catalysts for change in India’s Muslim community.

Tired of BJP’s propaganda, and Congress’s hollow proclamations of secularism, it is reassuring that India’s Muslims have finally begun to take matters into their own hands. For instance, in Bihar, organisations such as Bihar Anjuman have decided to take matters into their own hands by spurring the community onto a path of constructive action. On its homepage , it urges community to take responsibility into their own hands and strive to use their talents to the fullest. Another such initiative is the Rahmani 30, an institute set up to train poor but talented Muslim students for the prestigious IIT JEE (the entrance examination for securing admission to India’s premier engineering institutes, the IITs). A brainchild of Maulana Wali Rahmani and Abhyanand, a senior police officer in Bihar, it is one of the many subterranean changes which are taking place in the community.

However, much needs to be done, and there is still a long way to go. As pointed out by the Sachar report, India’s Muslims, and especially those belonging to the Indo Gangetic plain still face a variety of obstacles, which hampers their integration with the country’s mainstream. To give a small example, there is no state-sponsored Urdu medium school in Uttar Pradesh, a province home to about 40 million Urdu-speaking Muslims. Not only is this a gross injustice, but it is also against the Constitution. Although much hue and cry is raised about the issue of reservation, it is much easier, and certainly less controversial to make small incremental changes which can go a long way in ensuring that the community feels that it too has a stake, and a role to play in building the country’s future.

All said and done, it still baffles me that how we can ignore a community 170 million strong, larger than most nations. Surely, the ground is ripe for a million more Rahmani 30s and Anjumans. After all, the canvas that is India can’t be painted without all its constituent colours; Saffron, Blue, White and Green.

Dastangoi

This article was first published in Express Tribune, here

The good thing about the internet is what it does to distance. It can bring the flavour of your des or watan (land) right to your apartment in London.

Whilst I was on one of my random internet strolls one day, I chanced upon a clip of a recent Dastangoi event organized in Delhi. For those of you who don’t know, Dastangoi was a form of storytelling practised in Delhi and the Urdu speaking areas of the Indo-Gangetic plains. The concept was pretty simple. In the olden days, when the idiot box was still not invented, a Dastango (storyteller) would recite the tales of Amir Hamza and Tilism-e-Hoshruba, whilst his audience would stand there enthralled, and try to imagine a world of djinns, paris(fairies) and jaadugars (wizards).

For a sneak preview into that lost world, the University of Chicago has a rare audio clip of a Dastango named Baqir Ali, dated 1920.

Storytelling and oral transmission (no smirks please) has had a vibrant history in the Indian subcontinent. As desis, chatting is our favourite pastime. Right from the Vedas, which were transmitted orally for thousands of years, from guru (teacher) to student, we mastered the art of storytelling. An advantage of storytelling was that there was no class divide; the unlettered could enjoy it as much as their Persian/Sanskrit educated snoots. My own grandmother was particularly good at the art of storytelling, and it was a good pastime in those days of single channel TVs and load shedding. Tragically, then came cable TV, Playstations and iPods and storytelling soon began to fade away. When I asked my own mother if she knew any stories for her grandkids, she dryly replied that she could buy a CD for them.

Anyway, this article was about Dastangoi and not my own Dastan. As I was browsing random crap on the internet, I found something that was truly remarkable. Mahmood Farooqui, a renowned Urdu scholar had recently launched an initiative to revive the lost art of Dastangoiin India. Started a few years back, they have brought the ancient Dastans in front of contemporary audience. Initially, they started off with traditional works like Amir Hamza and Tilism-e-Hoshruba. However, recently I came across a satirical rendition of (what I assume to be) Amir Hamza, but in a contemporary political context, called ‘Dastan-e-Sedition’.

In Dastan-e-Sedition, the storytellers weave a complex tale of the land of Kohistaan, whose natives have been displaced by the jaadugars(the state). Slowly, the Dastan weaves through the thick maze of Indian politics, covering themes like extra judicial killings, corruption, the unfair arrest of Binayak Sen, and the overt sanskritisation of Hindi. Along with traditional narratives, the Dastangos break into Faiz, which makes it all the more enjoyable.

Later on, I also found a link to what appears to be a Punjabi form ofDastangoi. I have no idea what it is called, but it appears to be more rustic and folksy. This particular performance was based on the tragic tale of Mirza and Sahiba.

In Dastan-e-Sedition, the storytellers have brilliantly melded the contemporary on a relatively old (but not stale) art form. In doing so, they have breathed life and relevance into a lost art. In doing so, they have ensured that Dastan-e-Dastangoi stays alive for the years to come.

Reading between the lines

This article was published on the Express Tribune, here

It couldn’t have been a coincidence. As I was surfing the internet today for my daily dose of khabrein, two stories appeared side by side. The first story was about the growing suspicions of the US government that the Haqqani network had links to Islamabad. Yawn! On the not-so-other hand, the second story was about a recent statement by Sirajuddin Haqqani, in which he claimed that the group was no longer active in Pakistan. In his interview with Reuters, he claimed:

“"Gone are the days when we were hiding in the mountains along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Now we consider ourselves more secure in Afghanistan besides the Afghan people. Senior military and police officials are with us.”

If one carefully looks at the first sentence, it becomes evident that Haqqani is trying to dissociate his group from Pakistan. And if I were to venture a guess, he is hinting at something more fundamental than dislocation from Pakistani territory. Rather, he is trying to de-link his group from the Pakistani state. In the context of mounting US pressure on Pakistan, it is quite possible that this might be a diversionary tactic orchestrated by elements in the Pakistani state.

There is another possible motive behind this sentence. It signals that Sirajuddin Haqqani now wants the Haqqani group to be seen as a serious player, which is based firmly in Afghanistan. Traditionally, the Haqqani group has acted more like a service provider for more well known groups like the Al-Qaida, Quetta Shura and TTP and had no clear political ambition besides maintaining their hold over Khost and Paktia. In his second sentence, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s allusion to the Afghan people reveals an intention to portray the group as a legitimate, albeit quasi-political entity.

The last sentence in the extract confirms this. By referring to senior military and police officials, the group has tried to highlight the tenuous hold of Karzai’s regime and NATO forces over the country. Also, it fits well when seen in light of the brazen attacks in Kabul. However, that being said, it is interesting that the group has shirked away from claiming responsibility for the attacks. In this context, Sirajuddin says: “For some reasons, I would not like to claim that fighters of our group had carried out the recent attack on U.S. embassy and NATO headquarters. Our central leadership, particularly senior members of the shura, suggested I should keep quiet in future if the US and its allies suffer in future.”

His choice of words is particularly interesting. Instead of out rightly denying his group’s role in the attacks, he merely states that he would not like to claim its role. Whether this was a tacit admission of involvement is anyone’s guess.

Further in the interview, he tries to hint that it is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s forces that are active in attacks against the American forces. This confirms our suspicion that the group is trying to tone down its anti-American rhetoric to come to the negotiating table along with the Taliban. Simultaneously, it is also trying to portray Hekmatyaar’s forces as a rogue element in the equation, probably to sideline them in any post-drawdown arrangement.

The next few months should be particularly interesting as the political hyenas scramble for their share of the carcass left behind by the US forces. However, any viable political settlement is unlikely to take place until the domestic players eschew violence and try to come to a reasonable consensus. Secondly, it is equally necessary that the political and military elite of countries like America, Pakistan, India and Iran stop looking at this issue from the prism of geopolitics and abandon any cock-n-bull fantasies of strategic breadth, depth or height.

Afghan drawdown: The vultures descend

This article was published in Viewpoint Online and Express Tribune, Pakistan: here and here

Sometimes I go crazy. And in my craziness, I conjure ideas, which on second thought seem so foolish and naïve that I begin to laugh at myself.

Now that the die is cast and the United States is finally stepping up the process of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the vultures are finally swooping down to ensure that they get a piece of the carcass. Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia; all seem to have a stake in Afghanistan’s future. Out of these, Pakistan and India are arch rivals and have conflicting interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan, which often views Afghanistan as an extension of its own backyard seeks to play out the game of strategic depth in the country.

India, on the other hand is taking a more indirect route. Contrary to conspiracy theories, India is not likely to convert Afghanistan as a second front against Pakistan. Most of its work is focussed towards infrastructure production, development aid etc. However, it would be naïve to think that India’s role is only that of a Good Samaritan. Previously, India had provided indirect support to the Northern Alliance to counter Taliban, which was supported by Pakistan. Furthermore, it is reported that the Indian Air Force has a presence at the Farkhor Air Base in Tajikistan, just a few kilometers from the border with Afghanistan.

Now that America has begun its withdrawal, it would be interesting to see how the Afghan endgame shapes out. Naturally India would like to depend on its allies like the Tajiks to maintain its influence. Pakistan on the other hand, has a natural advantage and can play the Pashtun card to its advantage. It has previously enjoyed close relations with the Taliban, and now that America seems to be in a mood to talk with them, it seems likely that Pakistan is bound to play a pivotal role in the ensuing negotiations.

India has always been wary of negotiating with the Taliban, and unless it shows some ideological flexibility, it might see its role diminished in face of waning US presence. On the other hand, in spite of its obvious edge over India in this regard, would be foolish for Pakistan to pursue an India-centric policy. Much to the disappointment of its Generals neither is India willing, nor does it have the resources or the desire to turn Afghanistan into a proxy front against Pakistan. However, in case Pakistan does decide to revert to its earlier policy (the one practised in 90s), I don’t think India will just sit on the fence like a passive observer. The biggest loser in this power struggle would be the Afghan. Once again, he’d fall prey to feuds that aren’t his own.

So, this leaves us with a brilliant, but quixotic choice; and that is the crazy dream that I am talking about. Instead of competing over Afghanistan, isn’t it possible for us to co-operate? It has advantages for both countries. First of all, the amelioration of the situation in Afghanistan would have a direct impact on the problem of extremism that seems to have engulfed Pakistan. Conversely, any strategic adventurism can lead to another blowback. And I need not emphasize that Pakistan does not need another wave of unholy warriors lashing at its borders. The cooling of tensions would also be advantageous for India, which also faces the scourge of terrorism. Also, a pact with Pakistan could also provide Indian industry with a direct land route to Afghanistan. This can bolster trade and commerce in the region.

The past few weeks have seen frantic diplomatic negotiations. High level dialogue has resumed between India and Pakistan. On 24^th June, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan jointly agreed to fight terrorism. It is not entirely unrealistic to enlarge the scope of such co-operation to countries like India, China and Russia. After all, a peaceful Afghanistan is in everyone’s interest.

Last but by no means the least, this deal would be good for the Afghan. Sick of his nation being used as a geo-political whorehouse, the ending of all games (whether great or not so great) gives him a glimmer of hope against the backdrop of a dark present.

Baloch encounters

This article was originally published in Viewpoint Online, here

There are times when life seems a bit too co-incidental. It makes you run into the same thing over and over again. Yesterday, while I was going through my daily newspaper routine, I chanced upon a photograph of a Baloch village. Scrawled across one of the walls were the words ‘Pakistan Murdabad’. The graffiti did not stand out; in fact, the words seemed to merge in with the rest of the photograph. Anyway, soon enough, my fickle brain moved on to other things and the photograph, like the graffiti in it, receded somewhere deep down in my cerebellum.

Today, as I was sitting on a bench at the station waiting for my train, deeply engrossed in my newspaper, this Asian looking guy approached me, and asked me in Urdu“Hello, Aap mujhe bata sakte hain key eh train kab aayegi”. I told him what he about the train and resumed reading the newspaper. However, the guy wasn’t finished. He interrupted me again: “Aap Kahaan se hain?”. Realizing that he was in a mood to talk, I put down my newspaper, and replied “Mein Dilli se hoon, aur aap?”. Realizing that I was from India, he smiled and told me that he was from Balochistan. Before I could ask him anything, he proceeded to tell me about his affection for India. I politely replied that I was quite fond of Pakistan too. At this point, his expression changed and he tersely replied “Mein Pakistani nahin hoon!”.

I was a bit startled by his rather forceful response, but at the same time, I wanted to probe further. At the same time, I was a bit wary of the possibility of him breaking off into a Sunny Deol-esque anti-Pakistan rant in front of dozens of Londoners, who might misconstrue what he was saying. Very cautiously, I asked him “lekin zulm to markazi hukoomat kar rahi hai na”. He replied that it was indeed the army and the central government who were responsible for the mess. He then went on to describe, in uncomfortably explicit details, the alleged crimes committed by the Pakistani state. This was followed by praises of India. I nodded along, the thoughts of Nagaland and Kashmir lurking eerily in my head.

I enquired whether his anger was against Pakistan as a country or Pakistan as a state. His response was rather puzzling. Although his anger was primarily directed against the army, he said that he resented Punjabi domination. That was understandable, I thought. Being a Punjabi myself, I know that as a group we are quite used to regional chauvinism. While he was talking, I was thinking about the level of frustration that this fellow possessed; so much resentment that it propelled him to talk about his anger and resentment to an unknown stranger in a train. As the train chugged along, he was getting more and more vocal, and a few co passengers were eyeing us suspiciously. Interrupting him, I asked “To kya aap Pakistan se alehdgee chaahte hain?”. He replied in the affirmative. He then went on to praise the ‘support’ India had given to the Balochs, while I nodded uncomfortably.

This conversation was arbitrarily cut short by the sudden arrival of my destination. As our ways parted, we smiled and I went my way. On the way to my college, I thought about what he said. I was also ashamed of myself. Here I was, a member of the privileged section of our society, where the coercive power of the state remains largely unseen and a mere phone call is enough to keep troubles at bay. On the other hand was him, possibly a victim, or at the very least a direct observer of state brutality. The difference between us was the difference between him and what he called ‘Pakistan’; it was the difference between haves and have-nots.

A few hours later, as I was sitting on my computer reading an Urdu daily, I noticed the headlines; it read “Altaf Hussain warns Punjab, Balochistan is slipping away”. Unfunny coincidence, I thought.